Abstract. Anticipation allows a system to adapt to conditions that have not yet come to be, either externally to the system or internally. Autonomous systems actively control the conditions of their own existence so as to increase their overall viability. This paper will first give minimal necessary and sufficient conditions for autonomous anticipation, followed by a taxonomy of autonomous anticipation. In more complex systems, there can be semi-autonomous subsystems that can anticipate and adapt on their own. Such subsystems can be integrated into a system's overall autonomy, typically with greater efficiency due to modularity and specialization of function. However, it is also possible that semi-autonomous subsystems can act against the viability of the overall system, and have their own functions that conflict with overall system functions.
INTRODUCTION
Anticipation is a form of functionality that allows a system to adapt to conditions that have not yet come to be, either externally to the system or internally. Autonomous systems are systems that actively control the conditions of their own existence so as to increase their overall viability. The aim of this paper is to first give minimal necessary and sufficient conditions for autonomous anticipation, followed by a taxonomy of more complex forms of autonomous anticipation.
I will argue that in the simplest case an autonomous system such as a simple organism can embody the conditions for its viability in its whole organization, and does not require an independent internal model of either the external or internal conditions that it must anticipate in order to successfully adapt. However, internal modelling of external conditions permits more flexible anticipation and subsequent adaptation. Likewise internal modelling of the self (or parts of the self) permits more flexible anticipation and adaptation to internal changes, and furthermore permits internal changes that allow more effective anticipation and adaptation to external conditions. In more complex systems, there can be semi-autonomous subsystems that can anticipate and adapt on their own. Such subsystems can be integrated into a system's overall autonomy, contributing to overall viability of the whole system, typically with greater efficiency due to modularity and specialization of function. However, it is also possible that semi-autonomous subsystems can act against the viability of the overall system, and have their own functions that conflict with overall system functions.
I will give some examples of each class in this taxonomy. One especially interesting case is the sort of autonomy that arises in morally capable systems, in which moral goals often conflict directly with viability of the moral agent. I will argue that this implies the nonreducibility of at least some of the moral properties of the agent to its proper functionality. I will specify some of the conditions for moral autonomy, one of which is anticipation of the feelings and fate of others.
AUTONOMY AND ANTICIPATION
The notion of autonomy has many interpretations. I will restrict myself to a very strong version that is due to Kant in his Critique of Judgement (1790). On this version, Kant requires that autonomous activity must originate in the self. He suggests that this requires a new sort of causation (where he is presumably contrasting himself from the efficient causation common to the mechanical philosophy). Kant clearly associates this new form of causation with teleology and function, and argues that Judgement appropriates teleology or function in order to work. In particular, autonomous activity originates in functional organization, and serves some goal, function or purpose. Kant does not, however, seem to have though of teleology as a cause in itself, and I believe that he was right in so thinking. The required notion of causation is some version of self-causation, which has been ruled out as impossible since Aristotle (Juerrero 1999). This view that causation and its object cannot be the same must be revised.
1 I will start with some simplistic versions of autonomy, and gradually add more features until we reach the Kantian notion. The simpler versions require only that a goal is defined within the system itself. This is the basic requirement for autonomous activity (external conditions do not count). I will add further conditions that require the system to have more control over the goal. The Kantian condition requires that the goal itself is under control of the agent itself. I will lay done conditions in witch this is possible.
A common definition of an autonomous system in Artificial Intelligence and related research such as robotics is that the system can use an internal state to adjust some internal state of own. One example given in a standard introductory AI text is a robot that adjusts its timekeeper to Eastern Australian local time when it arrives in Sydney from Liège, rather than relying on external setting by a programmed input or by data from a local clock. Obviously, this example has problems with both necessity and sufficiency, and workers in the field are well aware of this, but the idea gives a rough and ready operational distinction between external programming and internal control. Note that this sort of autonomy, which I will call autonomy 1 , requires that the system have an internal model of itself (or rather part of itself) in order to control itself. This might be taken as a basic requirement of autonomy, but it will turn out that it is not strictly required, though it is very useful.
Autonomy does not directly imply the capacity to anticipate, but it is pointless unless it includes anticipation. The system described above, for example, has the capacity to anticipate the time in Australia, once it has set its clock to the local time. It could do this equally well if it were externally programmed or otherwise externally set, so we need to distinguish between autonomous anticipation and environmentally determined anticipation. Daniel Dubois (2003) has made a very useful distinction between external and internal control of future states that he calls, respectively, weak and strong anticipation. The former relies on external, or environmental, data to model future states of the environment, while strong anticipation uses internal data to model future internal states. In general, anticipation requires that some future state determines or guides present dynamics. Since the future state is not directly accessible, it must be modelled some place within the system and its environment. The notion of modelling here can be quite weak, but it is basically that of Rosen (1991) , which was earlier advocated by Hertz (Howard Pattee, personal communication). The idea is that one system (the object of the modelling) has a certain causal structure, and another system (it could be the same one if the modelling is internal, i.e., in strong anticipation) has a logical structure that mirrors the causal structure of the object. Anticipation further requires that the logical structure of the model is can be projected to possible future states, thus allowing the current modelling of future states. If the anticipation is to be adaptive, and thus functional, the causal structure of the embodiment of the model must be appropriately connected to the object so that it can constrain, guide and modify states of the object in order to control its future states.
Because of the close connection between causation and logic (Collier 1999a, Collier and Hooker 1999) , one way that the object can be modelled is for it and the embodiment of the model to obey the same causal laws. This sort of situation is highly symmetric, and it may be difficult if not impossible to decide which system is the object and which has the model (this is an issue of where the locus of control lies). A weaker relation is if the causal laws involved are analogues of each other (as in an analogue computer), but this still implies a high degree of symmetry. The symmetry is broken if on system (the modelling system) has a shorter time scale than the object, and thus can model future states of the object before they are reached. If the time scales are the same or very similar, then the relation is more one of tracking than of anticipation. Typically, tracking is required for anticipation (in order to obtain appropriate data), but the two should not be confused. Tracking itself, without anticipation, can be functional for a system, such as when the genome of a population tracks the adaptive landscape of its environment. I stress again that this situation is symmetrical, making the notions of function and control rather fuzzy at best.
More sophisticated forms of modelling are possible in a system in which the logic is not constrained by the details of its causal embodiment, as in a von Neumann computer or Turing machine. However, the logic alone cannot do the job of modelling in the Rosen sense, since there are typically multiple interpretations of any logical structure (the only exceptions are complete and decidable logics), whereas a Rosen model must model the object and no other. 2 Rosen was quite aware of this and cautioned against understanding his modelling relation in terms of mathematical model theory, although there are close connections. Having noted this issue, I will set it aside, assuming that there is a suitable resolution. Completely free logics like that of a Turing machine is not the only form of modelling more sophisticated than analogue modelling, and there are many intermediate forms filling the gap. Autonomy, as I will explain it as autonomy 3 below, is one of these.
Dubois conjectures that autonomy is characterized by strong anticipation. Whereas in weak anticipation future states of the environment are projected using a model of the environment and environmental data, in strong anticipation the system requires a model of itself (or part of itself) in order to project its future states from its current internal state. This can be as simple as a feeling of hunger anticipating a future need for food, but, of course, it can be much more complex. Dubois' conjecture is not only compatible with autonomy 1 , but it is implied by it. Since autonomy 1 is a bare minimum for autonomy (ignoring some very simple and uninstructive cases), Dubois' conjecture appears to be well founded. On the other hand, it appears to be too weak to require the sort of organic autonomy that Kant conjectured (which, recall, requires a new sort of causation), or Juarrero's version of selfcausation of actions in self-organized systems. These organizational versions of autonomy (though somewhat vague in the present development) are unabashedly teleological, something that autonomy 1 either ignores or presupposes. Dubois' conjecture therefore has the same problem. Nonetheless, it is a clear place to start to see what we must add to get a stronger, self-determinedly teleological autonomy.
Before addressing this issue I would like to consider the etiological view of function (Wright 1973 , Millikin 1989 , Neander 1991 ) that underlies the bulk of work on function in most fields today. I am going to argue that if this sort of functionality implies autonomy, then it violates Dubois' conjecture. I take it that this is fatal to the view, given Kant's linkage of teleology with organismic autonomy, not to mention the intuitive idea that if anything is autonomous, it is organisms in virtue of their capacity to select their own functions. The etiological view, I will argue, places control ultimately in the environment, either through selection of biological function (nature) or through environment in development (nurture), or some combination of the two. 3 The violation of Dubois' conjecture follows from the ultimately external control of function, and thus anticipation.
The basic idea of the etiological view is the F is the function of X if and only if X exists because it does F. Existence in this case can result either from selection or design, both of which are external causes, ignoring for the moment the idea of self-design, which does not come up in the context of the etiological view (so far at least). It is certainly possible that some internal structure is selected that models other internal structures, thus it seems that the etiological view permits Dubois' notion of autonomy. However, I think this is an illusion. Going back to the device that resets its clock on arriving in Sydney based on its internal state dynamics, on the etiological analysis it was either designed that way, or else it was selected naturally to act this way. If it was designed, then the problem of functionality just gets pushed back to understanding the functional nature of design, which either risks infinite regress, or else leads us to selection somewhere along the line if we assume the only two possibilities permitted in the etiological view. So, we are left with selection. 4 Given that the etiological view gives no other alternative to explain function, and has nothing in particular to say about autonomy, except perhaps that given determination by nature and nurture there is no such thing, I turn to the role of Dubois' condition. First notice that selection is not necessary for Dubois' condition: a device with strong anticipation might have arisen from some source other than selection. In fact it must have, because it has to exist to be selected. However, on the etiological view of function, the strong anticipation would not be functional until it has been selected for. It is possible to dictate this use of the words 'function' and 'anticipation', but it seems rather arbitrary. Normally we would consider anticipatory behaviour to be functional without much further thought. We might be wrong in some cases, but it is hard to believe that we are wrong in all cases or even the majority of cases. The etiological view would have it that we are wrong in exactly those cases in which the anticipatory trait has not been selected previously. This drives a wedge between anticipation and function. I now turn to the consequences of this for Dubois' distinction.
As far as sufficiency is concerned (whether or not Dubois' condition is necessary for selection, and hence functionality) things are a bit more complicated. Weak anticipation may well be functional, and it may well result from selection. Notice, however, that weakly anticipative behaviour must also exist in order to be selected, so the situation is comparable to the case of strong selection, and the etiological notion of function seems to be ad hoc or at least deserving of further independent justification. Perhaps we can live with this, especially without an alternative. Setting this aside for the moment, the question remains of whether or not the etiological account allows strong anticipation at all. It seems possible that strong anticipation could emerge and then be selected for. Ironically, however, the source of the functionality in all such cases, on the etiological view, is external. There is at least some tension in saying that the functionality is weak (so to speak) but the anticipation is strong. Furthermore, since all evolution and development is under the control of either nature or nurture, the ultimate causes are external, and it is perhaps just a manner of speaking to refer to strong anticipation and autonomy in such cases, since the full explanation of the existence of any anticipatory property will be reducible to some explanation in terms of genetic or developmental selection. This manner of speaking might be convenient in some cases, but it is dismissible. For example, taking the admittedly simple hunger case above, an animal is able to detect its hunger by monitoring itself, and it thus anticipates that it is going to need food eventually. So it starts to seek food when more immediate concerns have been dealt with. This is clearly adaptive anticipatory behaviour, and since there is anticipation of a future state (needing food to survive) from a current internal state (feeling hungry), it is nominally a case of strong anticipation. However, this story includes only the nurture perspective. When we turn to the nature of hunger, it seems reasonable that the capacity to self-monitor to anticipate the need for food is a result of selection, and thus under external control. On selectionist accounts, the appearance of this capacity (or at least the stages in its evolution) is accidental, and any anticipatory capacity is likewise accidental. The result, if we follow the logic of this impoverished view, is that hunger is weakly functional (it is selected externally), and it is strong anticipation, and thus autonomous on Dubois' conjecture. However, this autonomy is accidental until selected for, and this selection is external, which seems to make the autonomy either accidental or weak. The idea of accidental autonomy is at best hard to understand, and the idea of weak autonomy is no autonomy at all. So, either Dubois' conjecture is pretty much empty, or else there is an alternative to the etiological view that can bolster it.
I am going to argue next that there is an alternative that is (with one atypical exception) compatible with Dubois' conjecture, and, I will argue, is implied by it. This view is the organizational approach to function championed by Maturana and Varela (1980) and Rosen (11991), and revised somewhat by my colleagues and myself (Collier 1999b 
ORGANIZATION: OPEN AND CLOSED
We need a notion of autonomy that gives us natural functions and avoids the word play and deficiencies of the etiological approach. Ideally it would also be extensionally equivalent to Dubois' conjecture. The most basic natural function is contribution to viability or survivability. Such a function is likely to be selected for if its contribution (to fitness) is greater than any existing competing function. This last point would explain the appeal of the etiological view without committing to it. I have developed such a notion of autonomy at these meetings and elsewhere (Collier 1999b (Collier , 2000 (Collier , 2001 (Collier , 2004b , partly guided by study and criticism of the work of Maturana and Varela (1980) and Rosen (1991) Autonomy is basically self-directedness (which makes Dubois' conjecture appealing). It can be achieved by autopoiesis (operational closure, Maturana and Varela 1980), or, more or less equivalently, by closure to efficient causation (Rosen 1991) . In both cases control is to be found within the closure of the organization of the system. This sort of closure implies closure to information (Maturana and Varela 1980) in the sense of the capacity to predict and control. Call this autonomy 2 . It is justified to call this autonomy since all control arises from the organization of the self, ensuring self-direction and no external control (though the system is open to energy and matter, and is dependent on the distribution of these to some degree, but only as limits on the range of viability -which an organism's can alter through clever adaptations). The cohesion, or dynamical viability of the system, is provided by the appropriate organizational closure. Functionality is an operational notion, requiring the use of internal information within the organized system to guide its actions in ways that contribute to its viability. This idea implies Dubois' conjecture directly if such systems must have a model of themselves. I will argue that the existence of a model is not necessary, but is highly probable in any even moderately complex organism.
The closure required by implies that anticipation of the environment requires the conversion of environmental conditions impinging on the organism (or autonomous 2 system in general) into internal information, which constitutes a model of the environment. Thus the conditions for weak anticipation are satisfied. It is not so clear, however, that autonomy 2 requires an internal model of self for functional anticipation, since the very organization that produces closure also produces viability, and hence functionality. It seems possible that the model of the environment is contained in the whole of the information in the organization, and there is no segregation into information modules that might be considered to be separate models. This sort of organization would be autonomous 2 , but not strongly anticipative. Can we add strong anticipation? This requires that we have models of the self. In one sense the non-segregated autonomous 2 system does satisfy this requirement, since we can take it that the whole organization of the system is a model of itself. This is a bit ad hoc, however. It would be better if there were segregated modules that could serve as models of (parts of) the environment, and then further modules that can serve as models of these models, perhaps along the lines described by Hooker et al (1992) in which a control system controls the behaviour of a control system (which provides in principle a universal control system). 5 On the closed autonomy 2 approach any functionality of these modules must be derivative from that of the whole closed system, but it seems that to operate properly these organized subsystems must be somewhat independent and function to some degree on their own, which suggests some degree of autonomy. However, autonomy 2 cannot come in degrees; a system is either operationally closed or it is not. Consequently, it is not clear, on the autonomy 2 view, how anything smaller than the whole system can constitute, other than nominally, a model. I think that the simplest solution to this difficulty is to give up the closed model of autonomy and allow autonomous systems that are open to information, giving us autonomy 3 . This move is consistent with recent trends in systems theory such as niche construction in evolutionary biology (Laland et al 1999) and interactivism (Bickhard 1999 (Bickhard , 2000a (Bickhard , 2000b ) and distributed cognition as proposed by people like Hutchins (1995), Clark (1997, Clark and Chalmers 1998) and Kirsh and Maglio (1994) in cognitive science (of course the theoretical basis of these ideas can be traced back to von Foerster 1960 -they are hardly new, but have new empirical support). There is a developing consensus that information is processed not just internally, but through the world. This raises the question of how we can define autonomy so as to place it in the agent, and in general how to develop criteria for distinguishing internal from external, which is a minimal requirement for making sense of Dubois' conjecture.
Partly for this sort of case, I developed the idea of cohesion (Collier 1988 , 2000 , 2002 , Collier and Hooker 1999 , which is a dynamical unity condition that determines what parts are parts of the same thing. Cohesion comes in degrees and it can vary across various system dimensions, but in most cases it is relatively clear cut. Autonomy 3 is a case of cohesion that, like autopoiesis, is based on organizational closure, but in this case the closure is not complete. In order to distinguish the system from its environment we need to estimate the relative logical depth internally and externally that contributes to the viability of the system. Typically there will be a boundary at which there is a jump in logical depth, with the system having greater depth. When this is not so, system boundaries will indeed be vague, and autonomy will be doubtful.
This cohesion based version of autonomy, then, allows for degrees of autonomy, and it allows us to talk of some degree of autonomy for internal modules, as well as for the system as a whole, and we can speak of the functionality of modules in the context of their viability within the system (evolutionary or developmental) to this extent. Although it is possible to proclaim that the internal part is closed by defining operations and causes so as to make a distinction between what internal and external processes are called, this is merely a nominal distinction, and has no basis in the dynamics of the world. In any case, autonomy 3 allows there to be relatively autonomous internal modules, as required by Dubois' conjecture. There is still the possibility of a system that meets the requirements of autonomy 3 but is so integrated that there are no distinct internal modules. This is unlikely for any moderately complex autonomous 3 system, however, since there is a huge adaptive advantage in being able to control internal dynamics and organization, so such cases will be rare, if any exist at all. Examples of internal modules that have some degree of functional autonomy are the nervous system, the brain, its cortex, and other systems like the immune system. The forebrain is able to model and anticipate both on the basis of external and internal inputs without directly influencing other parts of the body. Other relatively autonomous subsystems can be similarly decoupled from direct external influences.
Now we come to a rather tricky part of the argument. The previous paragraph establishes that autonomy 3 permits Dubois' conjecture to hold, but it does not show that it requires it. There are two problems. First, it is possible to have a system that is autonomous 3 that has no internal differentiation. I have already rejected this as at best rare. Second, it might be that the autonomy of the internal modules is merely apparent, and is in fact reducible to external causes of some sort, as on the etiological function view. The answer to this is that the best explanation for autonomy 3 is self organization. Maturana allows that organized structures can form spontaneously, but he denies that they are self organized. I think that he is mistaken here, partly because of his adoption of a closed view of operational organization (the argument is found in Collier 2004a, and I will not repeat it here). Rosen (1991) argued brilliantly that some systems cannot be reduced to a mechanical algorithm, and conjectured that living systems are of this sort. Accepting this general idea as correct, if autonomy 3 systems must be self-organized, then they are not reducible. This can be shown analytically from the conditions of self-organization, which involve dissipative processes essentially (Collier 2004c ). There is no particular reason why information systems cannot similarly self-organize. The result is nonreducible in Rosen's sense, and so far as I can tell this sort of process is the only way to produce nonreducible systems. I have argued (Collier 2001 ) that a non-equilibrium system like an organism can self-organize around unanticipatable environmental impingements (and internal disturbances as well) so that the system accommodates to the new input, and spontaneously assimilates its influence. This creates an internal model of the novel stimulus. Any other processes than self-organizing ones are going to be reducible, and will be explainable in external terms. What remains are the self-organized systems and subsystems, which will by the nature of their formation have some degree of autonomy 3 if the self-organization is of the information and control aspects of the organization that make up autonomy 3 . Any resulting subsystems can be seen as models of the forces that led to their formation, though they cannot be reduced to these forces. Thus it appears that Dubois' strong anticipation does require autonomy 3 , and autonomy 3 implies strong anticipation (except for the improbable cases mentioned previously). If we take autonomy 3 to be true autonomy, then Dubois' conjecture is justified.
COMPETING AUTONOMOUS SUBSYSTEMS
When there are relatively autonomous 3 subsystems, it is possible that these systems can conflict with each other. To some extent this can be alleviated by treating the anomalous conflicts as novel data around which the whole system can reorganize. This allows, then, for anticipatory treatment of further conflicts through a minimally disturbing mediation. This sort of conflict resolution and mediation would typically contribute to the viability of the system, and thus would be functional. This is largely an internal process (though in cases like therapy, external impingements that are suitable directed might be helpful or even necessary). Increasing complexity in both evolution and development cannot arise from purely mechanical algorithmic processes, since these can create no new information. Self-organization can, however, and it is likely to be the major source of both genuine evolutionary and developmental novelty. As I have been arguing, the result is new internal organization, with nonreducible novel properties that can be viewed as modelling either external or internal conditions, permitting these modules to be used for anticipation, respectively weak and strong. So conflict and the unexpected is most likely the main if not only source of nonreducible complexity in any system. For autonomous systems like organisms and evolutionary populations, the main locus of reorganization that matters is the information system associated with autonomy 3 . Note that on the autonomy 3 account, these modifications are functional even prior to selection, though their adaptivity makes them likely candidates for selection. We can expect both evolution and development, then, to be characterized by increasing strong anticipation, with more isolation of models from direct external influence, and more mediation between the overall autonomy of the organism (or lineage or set of lineages in an interbreeding population) through the use of internal models.
SOME APPARENT COUNTEREXAMPLES
Despite this alluring picture, there seem to be some counterexamples: cases of autonomy 3 that undermine viability. For example, in humans the brain can develop its own purposes that conflict with viability, and lead to suicidal or risk taking behaviour. These cases might be regarded as maladaptive and pathological, and hence dismissed. It is harder to dismiss moral behaviour that puts ones viability at risk for the sake of others, since it is neither pathological nor maladaptive (at least for society).
I think that we have to accept that the autonomy 3 model allows self-organization at multiple levels in which the levels have conflicting criteria for viability (because the levels constitute different systems, in which the higher level systems are not merely sums of the lower level ones). For example, self-organization in economic and social systems can conflict with the economic and social interests of individuals. I take it that this explanatory power for the nonadditive nature of complex systems is an advantage of the autonomy 3 account. Autonomy 3 implies Dubois' conjecture in almost any realistic case, and is most probably implied by it. It gives a natural account of functionality in terms of organizational contributions to viability, and thus explains the appeal of etiological views of function. It also explains why there are some hard cases (because cohesion and thus autonomy 3 come in degrees), and how there can be semiautonomous modules within a system that can serve as internal models that can in turn be modeled to provide strong anticipation. Furthermore, it can relatively easily explain, as the closed autonomy 2 cannot, why there can be competing subsystems within a system that serve different ultimate goals.
